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A  STUDY  OF  FIRST-DAY 
SPACE MALFUNCTIONS 
by 
A. R. Timmins 
and 
R. E. Heuser 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
INTRODUCTION 
The  performance  of  a  spacecraft  during  launch  and  flight is influenced by many  tangible  and  in- 
tangible  factors. Good performance  creates  a  feeling  that  the  entire  cycle-planning, design, produc- 
tion,  quality assurance, test  and  evaluation,  and  management-is  functioning as desired. A single 
catastrophic  spacecraft loss, on  the  other  hand, raises questions  about every facet  of  the program. In 
fact,  a  committee investigating  a catastrophic loss can  usually  find weaknesses in  each  facet  of  a  pro- 
gram.  The recommendations  of  such  a  committee  not  only  improve follow-on  spacecraft in the  same 
program,  but  stimulate  improvement  in  other programs. Another  source  of  improvement  for all pro- 
grams  may be  from  the  composite  experience gained from  many  spacecraft.  Some  reports,  such  as 
References 1 and 2, have  depicted  the  number of failures versus time  from  launch. In  each  of  these 
references, the  number  of failures  per  spacecraft  were  abnormally high for  the  first 30 days  in space. 
The  number of first-day  failures departed even more  from  the  longer  term  trend. These data raise the 
following fundamental  questions: 
1. Are the failures  related to  the  launch  environment? 
2. Could  a  longer duration  test  in  a  simulated  space  environment  reduce  these early  failures? 
3 .  Can this  experience  be used to  improve  the  performance  of  future  spacecraft? 
The  present  study is directed to the  fundamental  questions listed and to the  development  of  any 
data which  can  be  helpful in improving  the  performance  of  unmanned  spacecraft.  There  are  two pri- 
mary  handicaps in this  kind  of  study: 
1. The unavailability of the failed item  for  unambiguous  failure analysis. 
2. The  incompleteness or lack of  documented  information. 
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The  second  handicap  has  been  minimized  by  including  only  spacecraft  which have been  the responsi- 
bility  of  Goddard  Space  Flight  Center.  Documented  information  has  been  available  in  many cases, 
and  in  some cases, the  experts  on  the failed item have  been  available for interview. The  first  handicap 
is the  more  difficult. The failure  diagnosis  usually indicates several possible causes. The  selection  of 
the  most likely  cause was made  by  the investigators after weighing the available evidence.  Despite the 
limitations,  an  analysis  of  early  space  failures  on  Goddard  Space  Flight  Center  spacecraft will be valu- 
able  and useful to  personnel  concerned  with the design, development,  test,  and  performance  of un- 
manned  spacecraft. 
DATA BASE 
Daily  Malfunction Frequency 
Fifty-seven unmanned  spacecraft  developed  under the management  of  Goddard  Space  Flight 
Center  are  the basis for  this  study.  The  experiments  and  subsystems  for  these  spacecraft have  been 
provided  by  various  organizations,  including Goddard  Space  Flight  Center,  other  government agencies, 
universities, and  aerospace  companies.  Eighteeh  of the spacecraft  received  a  full  system  test at Goddard 
Space  Flight  Center,  and 39 received a  full  system  test in a contractor's  facility.  Figure 1 depicts  the 
daily number  of  malfunctions  and failures for  the first month  in  space  of  the 57 spacecraft.  This  study 
will be  restricted to  the first-day  performance,  that is, 69  malfunctions,  of which 45 are classified as 
failures. The following definitions will be  applicable  throughout  the  report: 
1 .  A mazfunction is any  performance  outside  the specified  limits, either a  failure or a  problem. 
2. A failure is the loss of operation  of 
any  function,  part,  component,  or  subsystem 
whether  or  not  redundancy  permitted recov- 
ery  of  operation. 
3. A problem is any  substandard per- 
formance  or  partial loss of  function. 
Table  1  lists  the first-day  failures  and 
malfunctions  for  the  time period from  1960 
to  1970.  For  each  year,  the  number  of 
spacecraft  together  with  the  associated  first- 
day  performance is given. Table 2 categor- 
izes the 45 failures and  69  malfunctions as 
mechanical,  electrical,  electromechanical, 
11 pyrotechnic,  and miscellaneous  groups. 
30 Table 3 classifies the  malfunctions  (and fail- 
DAY ures) by  spacecraft function,  th t is, power, 
Figure  1-First-month space performance for  57 unmanned attitude control, command and data ban- 
spacecraft. dling, structure,  and  exper me ts. 
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Table 1 -First-day malfunctions  of  57  unmanned  spacecraft. 
" 
Launch 
Year 
~ " . 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Total 
." - . . 
.. . 
Number  of 
Spacecraft 
. . . .. . . - - -. . -. . 
2 
2 
8 
6 
8 
7 
6 
6 
4 
7 
1 
57 
. . -. , . . ". - 
- " 
Number  of 
Failures 
~. ~~ 
1 
1 
4 
5 
6 
9 
5 
3 
4 
6 
1 
45 
" ~~ 
Number  of 
Malfunctions 
~ .. 
1 
2 
8 
6 
7 
11 
9 
3 
7 
1 1  
4 
69 
Number  of 
Spacecraft 
Without 
Failures 
1 
I 
4 
2 
6 
4 
2 
3 
2 
2 
0 
27 
Table 2-Classification of  first-day  space malfunctions 
Type  of 
Malfunction 
~~ 
Electrical 
Mechanical 
Electromechanical 
Pyrotechnic 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
" . ~ 
by  type  of device. 
Failures 
Number 
25 
8 
5 
4 
3 
45 
Annual  First-Day Malfunction Frequency 
Percent 
~ 
55 
18 
1 1  
9 
7 
100 
Number  of 
Spacecraft 
Without 
Malfunctions 
1 
0 
3 
2 
5 
4 
2 
3 
1 
1 
0 
22 
Total  Malfunctions 
3 
100 69 
4 
The  data  on  the  number  of  first-day  malfunctions  per  spacecraft  each  year,  presented in Figure  2, 
indicate  that first-day  space  failures, in broad  terms, have not changed  significantly  over  a IO-year time 
period.  The  total  malfunctions  appear slightly  higher after  1964,  and  this coincides with  the  time 
when  larger, more  complex,  spacecraft  started to  be  launched.  The  bar  graphs  are averages per year 
and  include  the  spacecraft which  had no failures the first  day. Of the  sample  of  57  spacecraft,  27  had 
3 
. .  
Table 3-Classification of first-day malfunctions  by  spacecraft  function. 
T Failures Total  Malfunctions Spacecraft  Function I Number Percent Percent Number Experiment Structure Stabilization  and  control Power Command  and  data  handling Other 25 4 5 4 4 3 45 55 9 11 9 9 7 100 33 9 7 6 11 3 69 48 13 10 9 16 4 100 .~ Total 
no first-day failures. A look  at  these  27  by  year  (Table 1 )  also showed no  strong  trend  and  further 
indicated  that  the 57 spacecraft  could  be  treated as one  sample. 
CRITICALITY  OF  MALFUNCTIONS 
The  69  first-day  malfunctions  covered  by  this  study  include  from relatively minor to catastrophic 
events. In some cases the consequences  of  a  failure  have  been  reduced  because  protection (e.g., redun- 
dancy) has been  provided.  Two  terms  are  now  defined  that will help in the evaluation of the  impact 
of the  69 malfunctions. 
1. Mission Criticality-a measure  of  the  effect  of  a  malfunction  on  the achievement  of the mis- 
sion objectives. The loss is  given as a  percentage  of  the mission objectives. 
2. Component Criticality-a measure of 
the  effect of  a  malfunction on the  operation 
of  a component.  The loss is  given  as a per- 
centage  of  component  operation. 
Mission Criticality  and  component criti- 
cality  can  each  be considered with  and  with- 
out  the  effects  of  protection. For example, 
a  hypothetical  malfunction  could  be  that  a 
photomultiplier  tube fails. If the  tube is a 
basic sensor  in  an  experiment,  then  before 
protection,  the loss of the  tube is highly 
critical to  the  experiment  (component). If 
there is a  redundant  tube  that can  be turned 
on,  then  the loss of the  tube is not  critical to 
the  experiment. If the  failure of the experi- 
ment  (component)  did  not  detract signifi- 
cantly  from  the mission objectives, as could 
2 ' 5  F LEGEND: 
7 . . .  . . .  
. . .  . . .  
... 
. . .  . . .  . . .  
... ... ... 
... ... ... ... 
. .  . . .  
... 
'70 1960 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 
YEAR 
Figure 2-First-day space performance 
spacecraft. 
for 57 unmanned 
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be the case for  spacecraft  with several experiments,  the mission criticality  would  be  low  with  or with- 
out  the  redundant  photomultiplier  tube. Now  suppose  that  the  failure  mode was a high voltage break- 
down  that damaged the  spacecraft  power  supply.  In  this case the mission criticality  would be high. If 
the  spacecraft  power  supply were protected  such  that  a high voltage breakdown of the  tube  would  not 
damage the  supply,  then  the mission criticality is  again low.  The  preceding  example  illustrates  how  a 
single malfunction can  be  examined  in  terms  of  component  criticality,  before  and  after  protection,  and 
mission criticality  before  and  after  protection.  There  are  two reasons for considering criticality  before 
and  after  protection.  First,  there is something to  be learned  from  a  malfunction  in  terms  of  future 
efforts even if the  criticality of the  malfunction has been  reduced  by  protection.  Second,  the  effect  of 
protection can be  evaluated. 
Figure 3 shows the mission criticality  distribution.  The  catastrophic  and major  degrading mal- 
functions  (categories  l  and 2) make up  13  percent of the  total  number of  malfunctions  before  protec- 
tion is considered.  After  protection  these  malfunctions  are  reduced to 8 percent of the  total.  The 
reason for  this small decrease is that  there was no  protection  for  most of  these  malfunctions. This 
result  emphasizes the  importance of giving a  great deal of attention  to  unprotected mission-critical 
items.  (One  fact  that  should be mentioned  here is that  there is a  good deal of block  redundancy  at  the 
piece-part level, so that  the  failure of a piece part may never show  up as a  malfunction,  and  thus  the 
effect of redundancy  at  this level cannot be  evaluated.) 
Figure 4 shows the  component  criticality  distribution of  malfunctions.  The  catastrophic  and 
major degrading (to  the  component)  malfunctions  make up 54 percent  of  the  total  before  protection 
is considered.  Protection  reduces  these  malfunctions to  36 percent  of  the  total.  (The effectiveness of 
redundancy is higher when  category  1, 2, and 3 malfunctions are used  as the basis of comparison.) 
Now consider the  data of Figures 3 and  4  together. 54 percent  of  the  malfunctions were  cata- 
strophic  or major  degrading to  the  components involved  if redundancy  had  not been provided. Redun- 
dancy  reduced  the 54 percent to  36  percent. However,  only 8 percent  of the malfunctions  were cata- 
- (a ) 
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Figure  3-Mission criticality of first-day malfunctions of 57 
unmanned  spacecraft. 
strophic  or  major degrading to  the mission. 
The  reduction  from  36  percent to 8 percent 
is attributed  to  effective  isolation of  damage 
by design. For  instance,  catastrophic experi- 
ment failures have not resulted  in  catastrophic 
mission failures. 
CLASSIFICATION  OF  MALFUNCTIONS 
Malfunctions Related to  Type of Device 
A classification of  the first-day space 
malfunctions  by  type of device is  given in 
Table 2. It  shows  that  the  electrical  type 
accounts  for over 50  percent of total mal- 
functions,  and also 50  percent of the failures. 
The  percentage  ranking is not emphasized, as 
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Figure  4-Component criticality of first-day  malfunctions of 57 
unmanned  spacecraft. 
it would  probably  be  reordered if normalized 
by  piece-part or black-box count.  The  results 
do indicate  the  type  of device which has con- 
tributed  the largest number  of  malfunctions 
and failures. 
Another classification,  by  spacecraft 
function, is provided  in  Table 3. Over 50 
percent  of  the failures have been on  experi- 
ments. While this  indicates  a  fruitful  area 
for  improving  early  space  performance,  two 
additional  points  need to  be  noted. Many 
experiments fly  state-of-the-art  hardware 
with  the  attendant risk. Also,  a  project  man- 
ager can  take a  higher risk on  an  experiment 
knowing  its  failure will be  isolated  from 
other  spacecraft  functions. Overall, the  performance  of  experiments has  been  good; at  the same  time, 
to  improve our early  space performance,  the  number  of  experiment failures  needs to  be  reduced.  The 
term  “structure” as used in  Table 3 includes  such  items as appendages  and  booms. In no case was 
there a  failure  of the basic spacecraft  structure. 
Malfunctions not Related to the  Launch  Environments 
Since  this paper deals with  malfunctions  that have occurred  on  the  first  operational  day in space, 
the  launch  environments  are a  possible  cause. The  launch  environment  has  many  facets.  The  most 
obvious  aspect is the  vibration/acoustic  environment. However, such  things  as  changing  pressure,  out- 
gassing of  materials,  and  thermal  effects  during  the  first  day  are all possible  causes  of  malfunctions. 
Many of  the  malfunctions  fit  into  these categories, but  there were  a  significant number  that  did  not. 
Those  malfunctions  that were known  or  judged  to  be  unrelated  to  an  environment were  removed from 
the sample  of malfunctions. This  diminished base of  malfunctions-total  minus  those  unrelated to 
environment-was then used to  compute  the  test effectiveness, with  respect to  first-day  malfunctions. 
A test effectiveness  can be  calculated  for  vibration,  simulated  space  test, or total  test program. For 
this  purpose,  the  total  number  of  vibration  defects,  for  example, were those  found  in  test  plus  those 
which  occurred  the  first  day  in space. The  vibration  test  effectiveness is then  defined as the  percent- 
age found  in  test of the  total  number  of  defects. 
A question  might  be asked  as to  how  it was determined  that  some  of  the  malfunctions were not 
related to  the  launch environments.  In  some cases, this was  very simple,  whereas in others  it was a 
matter  of  judgment.  For  instance,  two  particular  malfunctions were  explained  by  a  wiring  error.  The 
error in the drawing was not  found  until  it was necessary to  investigate the space  malfunction,  but 
these  malfunctions  certainly  were not caused by  the  launch  environments. In other cases, information 
available on  the  nature  of  the  failures revealed that  they were not caused by  the  launch  environments. 
For  example,  one  spacecraft  spun  up  about  the wrong  axis  because  of the  overpowering  of  the active 
nutation  control  system  by  an energy  sink that was not fully anticipated. Again, this is not a launch 
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environment  problem. Many of  these  problems  unrelated to the  launch  environments  could possibly 
have been found  during  the  environmental  test  sequence,  but  their  detection  would  not have  been due 
to  the environment.  Therefore, in assessing the effectiveness  of  environmental  tests, the first-day fail- 
ures  not caused by  the  environment have  been  deleted.  In the vibration-related study, 34 percent  of 
the failures  were  judged to  be  unrelated to vibration,  while  in  the  thermal-vacuum  study, 56 percent 
were judged to  be  unrelated to  this  environment. 
Vibration-Related Malfunctions 
The  first  method used to  analyze  space  malfunctions was to  decide  whether  the  malfunctions 
were  probably or  even possibly  related to  the launch  vibration.  In  most cases, the  launch  vibration en- 
vironment  could  not  definitely  be  established as the cause  of the  problem. A number  of  reports did 
mention  vibration  as  a  possible  cause,  though,  and  when  this was the case, the  malfunction was con- 
sidered  vibration  related.  There  were  other  malfunctions  that were judged to  be possibly vibration 
related,  although  reports  did  not  attempt to  assess the cause. 
The  second way  in which the  data were  analyzed was to  determine  whether  the  malfunction was 
unrelated to  vibration;  that is, if vibration  could  not be  ruled out,  then  it  might possibly have  been the 
cause. A few  additional  malfunctions  fell  into  this  unknown  category.  These  two  methods will be 
used to  put  bounds on the  vibration  test effectiveness. 
Vibration Test  Effectiveness 
The  vibration  ground  test  and  flight  data were examined to  try  to answer  two basic  questions: 
1. How well does  the  vibration  ground  test  detect  malfunctions  that  are  vibration  related? 
2. Is there  any  relation  between  the  number  of  malfunctions  a  spacecraft has during  test  and 
whether  it has any in space? 
The  answer to  the first  question can be thought  of as the  test effectiveness.  According to  the defini- 
tion  of  test effectiveness given previously, the  vibration  ground  test was found  to be  between 80 per- 
cent  and 90 percent  effective. The  data were also used to  calculate the  vibration  test effectiveness for 
several different  types  of  spacecraft  equipment:  electrical, mechanical,  electromechanical,  and  pyro- 
technic.  The  results  are  summarized in Figure 5. The mechanical  device test effectiveness  indicates 
that  vibration  testing  eliminates  almost all vibration caused mechanical  device  malfunctions. The elec- 
trical device test effectiveness  is  nearly as good as the mechanical. The  electromechanical  device  test 
effectiveness drops  off  significantly,  and  the  pyrotechnic device test  effectiveness is poor.  The  upper 
bound  on  the  test effectiveness was calculated  from  the  defects  that were  possibly  vibration  related. 
The  lower  bound was calculated  from  the possibles plus the  unknowns.  The  sample  for  electrome- 
chanical and  pyrotechnic devices is  small, and  this  tends to  diminish  the  confidence  in  the  calculated 
test effectiveness of  these devices. 
In order  to  answer  the  second  question  about  the  relationship of the  number  of  test  malfunctions 
and  the  number  of  space  malfunctions,  the  spacecraft were  categorized  according to the  number  of 
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malfunctions  they  had  experienced  during  vibration  test. These data  are  presented  in  Figure 6. The 
abscissa is the  number  of  malfunctions  a  spacecraft  had  during  test,  and  the  ordinate is he  number  of 
spacecraft  with  that given number of  malfunctions.  The  space  performance was then  examined to de- 
termine  how  many  spacecraft  in  each  category  later  had  a  space  failure. For example,  of the eight 
spacecraft  that  had  zero  test  malfunctions,  only  one ( 1  2 percent)  suffered  a  space failure. Of the  four 
spacecraft that had  four  test  malfunctions,  two (50 percent)  had  space failures. The  percent  in  each 
category is shown  in  Figure 7. 
Malfunctions  With  Unknown Cause 
In a  strict sense, all of  the  malfunctions  could  be classified as due  to an unknown cause. In no 
case  was the  hardware  recovered. Hence, the various classifications have  been  made on  the basis of 
circumstantial  evidence  and  judgment. This leads to an apparent  contradiction, which is explainable. 
With respect to  the thermal-vacuum  environment,  some 30  percent of the  malfunctions were classified 
as unknown,  but  with  respect to  the vibration  environment,  only 22 percent were classified as un- 
known (see Figure 8). An  example will make  the  contradiction  understandable. 
An experiment  which had  a sealed cover did not  function in space.  The evidence indicated  that 
the  ordnance used to eject  the cover did not fire. A no-fire condition  could  result  either  from  a  broken 
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bridge wire in the  ordnance,  or  from an open  circuit,  and 
there were several connectors in the firing line. Thus,  for 
90 - 98% the  purpose  of classification, this  failure was possibly re- 
ELECTRICAL (E) 81 - 88% 
MECHANICAL(M) 
ELECTROMECHANICAL (E/M) 64 - 70% 
PYROTECHNIC (PY) 43 - 60% lated to  vibration, but unknown for its relationship to the 
thermal-vacuum  environment. 
0 POSSIBLE VIBRATION CAUSE 
0 U N K N O W N  CAUSE 
Thermal-Vacuum  Related  Malfunctions 
About 9 percent of the  malfunctions  were  judged to 
be  caused  by the thermal-vacuum  environment. In each 
case except  one,  the evidence indicated  a  corona  problem. 
In one case, the  corona was catastrophic  to  the mission, 
and  in  the  others,  it was catastrophic to an  experiment. 
Another 29 percent were classified as due  to  unknown 
causes and  could possibly have been related to  the 
thermal-vacuum  environment. 
n The  number of malfunctions  related to  the thermal- 
vacuum environment is small compared to  the  number 
related to  the vibration  environment (9 percent versus 44 
uercent). This is due  to  the  fact  that  this  study  considers 
Figure 5-Vibration test effectiveness. 
only  the  first-day  malfunctions. A study  of  malfunctions 
that  occurred  after  the first  day  could  be expected  to 
change the  ratio. 
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failure,  although  one possible open  circuit  could have  been  a  relay  failure.  Although the  conclusion is 
obvious, the  data  emphasize  the  need  for special attention to non-redundant  items. 
Of the  total 69 component  malfunctions, 45 were classified as failures. About 40 percent  of 
these were  eliminated  by  redundancy. Of the  remainder,  about 40 percent were  restricted  in  effect 
to the  component  or  experiment, and did  not  result  in  a  significant mission loss. In  other  words, 
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Figure 8-Relationship of first-day space failures to the launch 
environment. 
design, either redundancy or isolation  of 
damage,  reduced to 16 the  number  of fail- 
ures  which  had  a  significant  effect on attain- 
ing  mission  objectives. 
Overall, the mission criticality  of  com- 
ponent  failures has  been  reduced  effectively 
either  by  redundancy  or  by  isolation  of fail- 
ure  damage  by design. On the  other  hand, 
these  data  indicate  that  catastrophic  and sig- 
nificantly  degrading mission failures  can be 
expected  in  the  future.  The cause will prob- 
ably not  be a  failure  of an electronic piece 
part,  but  rather a  design,  a function,  or  an 
item  that  cannot be  effectively demonstrated 
in  test.  It  should  be  noted  that  there is no way of  knowing  how  many mission-critical failures  were 
saved by  redundancy  of  electronic piece  parts. 
Catastrophic  Failures 
Catastrophic  and  major degrading mission failures  have  usually  been the  result  of a design prob- 
lem which was not  or  could  not  be  tested  adequately.  Table 4 attempts  to summarize  the  category 1 
and 2 mission-critical  failures. The  summary is a gross oversimplification,  for  each  failure was the sub- 
ject  of intensive study  and  investigation.  In  most cases, a  comprehensive  report gives much  more in- 
formation  than can be  documented here.  However, some  important lessons learned  from  the cata- 
strophic mission failures are summarized  below: 
1. Special attention  and analysis is required  for  non-redundant, mission-critical items,  especially 
if they  cannot be functionally  tested  in  the  system  configuration. 
2. Although  electronic piece parts  can cause loss of missions, the  experience  reported  does  not 
show  this to  be  a prominent cause. 
3. Deployment  mechanisms  should  be designed with large margins  of  safety. If feasible, redun- 
dancy in force  producing  elements  should  be  considered. 
4. Deployment  tests  should  be  performed  after  vibration  tests,  and  should  include  temperature 
simulation  when  applicable. 
5. High voltage  subsystems  should  be  tested in a  launch-pressure  profile  environment if possible. 
If this is not possible, then  turn-on  in  space  must be  delayed  until  the  subsystem is known to be out of 
the critical-pressure  region. That is, the  turn-on  time used in orbit  should  be  no  sooner  than  that used 
in the  simulated  space  test  of  the  spacecraft. 
6. The design capacity of an  attitude  control  system  must be  sufficient to handle all Sources of 
energy  dissipation,  including  the  energy  dissipation  from the fluid  in  any  heat pipes. 
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Table  4-Summary of  category  1  and 2 mission failures. 
- .  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
- 
1 
." 
Redundant 
. ... - 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
? 
Yes 
No 
- "" 
Design 
Problem 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
? 
No 
Yes 
" ~ 
Tested 
Adequately 
~~ ~. 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
? 
Yes 
No 
" 
.. 
Description , 
~ 
Could not maintain  earth  lock  because  the  horizon 
scanners  locked on  extraneous  thermal gradi- 
ents  in  the earth's infrared image. Gas supply 
in  the  attitude  control  system was depleted  in 
about 9 days. Corrected  subsequently  by re- 
duction of bandwidth  for  horizon  scanners. 
Two  of eleven booms  deployed  only  partially  and 
one  made  a false horizon  for  the  horizon scan- 
ner.  A single cause was not  determined,  but 
marginal torque  of  the springs in  the  boom 
hinges was  a prominent  factor. 
Solar  panel failed to deploy  completely.  Spinup 
completed  deployment. 
Vidicon  camera  degraded  because  of contamina- 
tion  from  third stage rocket. 
Arcing  of star  tracker caused  electrical  transients 
and noise which  caused  widespread  damage. 
Many functions  including  telemetry  were  af- 
fected. 
Controller failed to properly  control  the charge 
current to  the  batteries  and  temperature be- 
came excessive. One possible cause was an  open 
circuit  from  a relay failure. 
Sharp  cut-off  of  telemetry signal 20 seconds  after 
ignition  of  apogee  motor. Many failure  modes 
possible. Pressurized titanium  tanks were notch 
sensitive, which  made them  suspect,  but  post- 
mortem  tests  did  not verify this conclusively. 
A  squib  failure  precluded  spin-up of spacecraft/ 
booster. Redundant squib satisfactory. 
Rapid  and excessive nutation  overpowered  the 
automatic  nutation  control  system  and  the 
spacecraft  went  into  a  flat  spin.  A  principal 
cause was the lack of  definitive  data on  the 
damping  characteristics  of the  heat pipes. Sev- 
eral  experiments still  provided  good  data. 
~~~ 
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Experiment Failures 
The  data have shown  that over 50 percent  of  the  first-day  failures  were  on  experiments,  and  this 
is the  most  fruitful  area  for  improving  the  first-day  space  performance.  The  information available on 
each  failure was reviewed for clues on ways to improve the first-day  space  performance  of  experiments. 
There is no single weakness  evident, as indicated by the  tabulation  in  Table 5. 
The  surprise is the comparatively  low  percentage  of 
5-C1assification Of first-day space failures attributed to fragile and sensitive items. These failures of  experiments. 
Classification 
Fragile and sensitive items 
Wiring, connectors,  shorts 
High voltage 
Electronic piece part 
Contamination 
Unknown 
Miscellaneous 
Percent  of 
Failures 
24 
16 
12 
8 
8 
20 
12 
. ~- 
items have  been  and will continue  to  be  a  source of  con- 
cern,  but  the  record to date has been very good.  Con- 
tinued vigilance on high voltage susceptibility, wiring 
errors  and  routing,  and  interrupted  circuits  from marginal 
connectors is necessary;  and especially, it  should  be 
demonstrated  that  vibration  does  not cause changes  in 
these  items.  Quality  assurance, screening tests,  preferred 
parts  burn-in  tests,  redundancy,  etc.  have  apparently 
been quite successful in  limiting  failures  from  electronic 
piece parts.  The  item  in  the  table  on  contamination 
shows  only 8 percent  but  this  factor  probably will be 
more  important  in  the  future. With the  trend  toward 
more  cryogenic-type  detectors, the outgassing of  mate- 
rials will be  more  critical. A heater  capability  on  a  cryogenic  detector  could possibly have saved one 
experiment.  Future  cryogenic  detectors  are  planned to have  a heater  capability to offset possible con- 
tamination  problems. 
These data  show  that  improvement  of  experiment  performance  in  early  space life will not be 
achieved by  the  elimination of  a single primary cause. Improvement will be achieved only by contin- 
ued or increased diligence and vigilance in all the  known  trouble areas. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has dealt  only  with  first-day  space  malfunctions  and failures. C.onsequently,  it  may 
give a  distorted  picture  of  the  performance  of GSFC  spacecraft  for the  ten  years covered by  the  study. 
On the success side of the  picture,  56  of  the  57  spacecraft  obtained useful scientific  data. A listing 0.f 
the  scientific  accomplishments would  be  most impressive, but would be  too  extensive  for  this  study. 
It will suffice to say that  there has been  a  quantum  jump  in  our  knowledge  of  the  earth,  lunar,  and cis- 
lunar  atmospheres,  of  the  sun,  and  of  the  stars. In addition,  the  advances  in  communications, televi- 
sion transmissions  between  continents,  and  weather  forecasting  are  already  accepted as everyday  hap- 
penings. Truly the successes are  outstanding,  and  the  present  study is not  intended  to  detract  from 
them.  Our  purpose will be achieved if the  experience  documented  in  this  study is helpful  in  reducing 
the  number  of first-day space  malfunctions  in  the  next  decade. 
The  following  conclusions  are  drawn  from the  study  of  first-day  malfunctions: 
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1. The  incidence  of  first-day  malfunctions  has  been  higher  than  desired. 
2. The  ratio  of  catastrophic mission malfunctions to the  total first-day  malfunctions is small. 
3. Electronic  piece-part  failures  have not been  a cause of  the  catastrophic mission failures. 
4. Catastrophic  or  major degrading  first-day mission failures  were  usually  identified  with  items 
that could not  be  (or were not) given an  adequate  system level test. 
5. Corona  failures, although  not  prominent  in  number, can be  catastrophic in damage. 
6. The  vibration/acoustic  launch  environment is estimated to  account  for 30 to 60 percent  of  the 
first-day  space  failures reviewed in  this  study. 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Greenbelt, Maryland, May 17,  1971 
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